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Zusammenfassung: Ob die Vergangenheit oder die Zukunft unendlich sein kann, 
ist eine interessante Frage für theologisches Arbeiten an der Beziehung zwischen 
Gott und Zeit sowie der Eschatologie. In einem jüngst erfolgten Austausch ist Wes 
Morrison zu dem Schluss gekommen, dass wenn William Lane Craigs bekannte 
Argumentationskette gegen die Möglichkeit einer anfangslosen Serie von Ereig-
nissen funktioniert, diese auch ebenso die Möglichkeit einer endlosen Serie von 
vorherbestimmten Ereignissen ausschließt. Er argumentiert, dass weder Craigs 
Behauptung, dass eine endlose Serie von Ereignissen potentiell unendlich ist, 
noch die Behauptung, dass zukünftige Ereignisse nicht existieren, diesen Schluss 
erfolgreich verhindern können. Ich behaupte, dass ein Befürworter des Kalam 
Arguments Craigs Verneinung einer aktuellen unendlichen Zahl von Sätzen nicht 
folgen muss, und ich zeige, wie Morristons Schluss verhindert werden kann. Im 
Einzelnen argumentiere ich, dass eine asymmetrische Behandlung der Vergan-
genheit und der Zukunft gerechtfertigt ist durch eine dynamische Theorie der 
Zeit, während die Unterscheidung zwischen abstrakten und konkreten Unend-
lichkeiten hilfreich ist, um auf Morristons Gegenargument, das auf einer Zahl von 
noch zu sagenden Lob der Engel basiert, zu antworten.
Schlüsselwörter: Gott und Zeit, Eschatologie, Kalam Kosmologisches Argument, 
Platonismus
Summary: Whether the past or future can be infinite is an interesting question 
for theologians working on the relationship between God and Time as well as 
Eschatology. In a recent exchange, Wes Morriston concluded that if William 
Lane Craig’s familiar line of argument against the possibility of a beginningless 
series of events worked, it would work just as well against the possibility of an 
endless series of predetermined events. He argued that neither Craig’s claim that 
an endless series of events is potential infinite nor the claim that future events 
don’t exist is successful in blocking this conclusion. I argue that a proponent of 
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the Kalam Argument does not have to follow Craig’s denial of an actual infinite 
number of propositions, and I show how Morriston’s conclusion can be blocked. 
In particular, I argue that an asymmetric treatment of past and future is justified 
on a dynamic theory of time, while the distinction between abstract and concrete 
infinities is helpful for responding to Morriston’s counter-argument based on the 
number of angelic praises yet-to-be-said. 
Keywords: God and Time, Eschatology, Kalam Cosmological Argument, Platonism
1  Introduction
Can the past or future be infinite? This question is of interest to theologians 
working on the relationship between God and Time as well as Eschatology, and 
it is the subject of a recent exchange between philosophers of religion Wes Mor-
riston and William Lane Craig.1 The dispute between Morriston and Craig con-
cerns Craig’s asymmetric treatment of the past and the future. Craig argued that, 
while the future may be infinite, the past must be finite. Morriston objected that if 
Craig’s argument against the possibility of the actual infinite based on paradoxi-
cal implications (as illustrated by Hilbert’s Hotel) worked as advertised, it would 
not only rule out a beginningless series of past events as Craig intended, it would 
also rule out an endless series of pre-determined events, which seems inconsist-
ent with Christian Eschatology. Craig replied by clarifying that an infinite future 
is possible, but only in the sense that it is potentially infinite; whereas an infinite 
past is impossible because the past cannot be a potentially infinite. 
The distinction between actual infinite and potential infinite is important 
here: An actual infinite is conceived as a determinate whole actually possess-
ing an infinite number of members, in contrast with a potential infinite which 
never actually attains infinity, although it increases perpetually towards infinity 
as a limit. At any point in time a potential infinite is actually finite.2 The crucial 
1 Wes Morriston, “Beginningless Past, Endless Future, and the Actual Infinite,” Faith and Philos-
ophy 27 (2010): 439–450; William Lane Craig, “Taking Tense Seriously in Differentiating Past and 
Future: A Response to Wes Morriston,” Faith and Philosophy 27 (2010): 451–6; Wes Morriston, 
“Beginningless Past and Endless Future: Reply to Craig,” Faith and Philosophy (forthcoming), 
available at http://spot.colorado.edu/~morristo/reply2Craig-forthcoming.html.
2 William Lane Craig and James Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in The 
Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2009), 103–105. Craig explains that because set theory with its definite and distinct 
elements does not utilize the notion of potential infinity, a set containing a potentially infinite 
number of members is impossible, indeed no set could capture the essentially dynamic character 
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point is Craig’s idea that the future can be potentially infinite whereas the past 
cannot, and this justifies his asymmetric treatment of the past and the future. 
I shall explain Craig’s idea in what follows:
When we ask for the causes of the existence of the stars, as well as the causes 
of the causes of their existence, we are asking for causes which actually existed, 
we are not asking for causes which potentially existed. Likewise, the events that 
led to the formation of our sun, for example, have already happened, that is, they 
have already been actualized, and their number is no longer increasing perpetu-
ally but a determinate whole. Hence, when we ask whether there could be an 
infinite regress of causes or events or changes or intervals of time, we are asking 
whether there could be an actual infinite regress, and not whether there could 
be potential infinite regress, for given that the number of (say) events in the past 
of any event is a determinate whole it cannot be a potential infinite. The past is 
either actual infinite or actual finite.
The number of events in the future of any event, however, can be a potential 
infinite if one embraces a dynamic (A-) theory of time. According to this theory, 
the members of a series of events come to be one after another, and the number 
of events which have happened would be increasing perpetually if the future 
is unending (although the number of events which have happened prior to any 
actual event(s), say the formation of our sun, would not be increasing perpetually 
but is a determinate whole, as noted above). By contrast, according to a static 
[B-] theory of time, the members of a series of events do not come to be one after 
another, rather the series of events is a tenselessly existing manifold all of whose 
members (including future events) are equally real. On a static theory of time, the 
future cannot be a potential infinite; it would be either finite or actually infinite.
In short, the number of events lying in the future of any event can be a poten-
tial infinite depending on what theory of time one adopts and whether the future is 
unending, but the number of events lying in the past of any event cannot be a poten-
tial infinite in any case, because the past does not contain any potential events that 
have not been actualised. Craig has argued that paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel 
show that actual infinities cannot exist, and therefore neither the past nor the future 
of potential infinite. Such a collection would be one in which the membership is not definite 
in number but may be increased without limit. It would best be described as indefinite (ibid). 
Against Oppy’s tenseless characterizations of potential infinite (Graham OPPy, Philosophical 
Perspectives on Infinity [New york: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 261–4; cf. 244–5), Craig 
observes that a major shortcoming of these characterizations is that they are incapable of han-
dling views of time which regard tense and temporal becoming as objective features of reality 
and, hence, worlds in which the future is potentially infinite in the sense of growing toward 
infinity as a limit. See William Lane Craig, “Review of Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity, by 
Graham Oppy,” Philosophia Christi 10 (2008): 201–208.
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can be actual infinite. Nevertheless, as a proponent of the dynamic theory of time, 
Craig thinks that the future can be potentially infinite whereas the past cannot.3 
Let us now discuss in greater detail the arguments of Morriston and Craig’s 
replies. Morriston proposed a thought experiment featuring a pair of angels to 
illustrate his point:
‘Suppose that God has just decreed that Gabriel and Uriel will take turns 
praising Him for one minute of celestial time, and that they will do so forever. 
Gabriel will do the odd-numbered praises and Uriel the even-numbered ones. 
Let’s go a step further. So as not to leave any opportunity for Gabriel or Uriel to 
mess things up, let’s suppose that this is no mere instruction or recommendation, 
but that God has exercised His supreme power in such a way as to make it the 
case that each praise in the endless series of praises we have envisaged will occur. 
Each of them is discrete, wholly determinate, and certain to occur because God 
has determined that it will occur… If you ask, ‘How many distinct praises will be 
said?’ the only sensible answer is, ‘Infinitely many.’’4
Morriston asserted that a scenario like the above is surely possible given the 
assumptions widely shared by theists. Observing that Craig’s argument against 
the possibility of the actual infinite based on paradoxical implications has been 
offered in support of the premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument that the 
universe began to exist, Morriston claimed that he can derive the same sorts of 
allegedly absurd implications that friends of the Kalam argument claim to be able 
to derive from a beginningless series of events, as follows:
‘God could instead have determined that Gabriel and Uriel will wait a celes-
tial minute after each pair of praises, thus making ‘room’ for infinitely many more 
praises by a third angel – Raphael, say. Infinitely many praises by Raphael are 
‘added,’ and the praises of all three angelic beings will be said in the same (infinite) 
amount of time. That’s absurd…God could instead have determined that Gabriel 
and Uriel will stop after praise number four. Infinitely many praises would be pre-
vented, and the number of their future praises would be only four. Alternatively, 
God could have determined that Gabriel be silent during all the celestial minutes 
between Uriel’s future praises. In this case too, infinitely many praises would be 
prevented, but the number of future praises would instead be infinite. That shows 
that your infinite future praise scenario has inconsistent implications.’5
3 In a recent article, Landon Hedrick objects that the ‘Hilbert’s Hotel Argument’ (HHA) is inef-
fective against proponents of presentism, which includes Craig himself, but I have replied that 
it is very easy to modify HHA such that it addresses Hedrick’s objection. See Landon Hedrick, 
“Heartbreak at Hilbert’s Hotel,” Religious Studies, 50 (2014): 27–46; Andrew Loke, “No Heart-
break at Hilbert’s Hotel: a Reply to Landon Hedrick,” Religious Studies 50 (2014): 47–50.
4 Morriston, “Beginningless Past, Endless Future” (see above, n.1), 443. 
5 Ibid, 444.
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Morriston concluded that if the theist does not think that these implications 
show that the endless series of predetermined events featured in the scenario is 
impossible, then neither should they agree with Craig that the allegedly absurd 
implications of a beginningless series of past events show that a beginningless 
series is impossible.
In his reply to Morriston, Craig argued that, on an dynamic (A-) theory of 
time, the series of praises that will be said by either (or both) of the angels in Mor-
riston’s scenario is merely potentially infinite. Craig argued that it is ‘composed 
of a finite but ever increasing number of events with infinity as a limit…So with 
respect to Morriston’s illustration of two angels who begin to praise God forever, 
an A-theorist will concur whole-heartedly with his statement, ‘If you ask, ‘How 
many praises will be said?’ the only sensible answer is, infinitely many’ – that is 
to say, potentially infinitely many. If this answer is allowed the A-theorist, then 
Morriston’s allegedly parallel arguments collapse.’6 
Craig then argued that Morriston’s proposal that one can derive the same 
sorts of allegedly absurd implications would not work, because in Morriston’s 
scenario the infinity involved is merely potential and the number of praises said 
by the angels will always be finite. Craig explained, ‘God could have made room 
for potentially infinitely many more praises by a third angel, in which case poten-
tially infinitely many praises are ‘added,’ and the praises of all three angels will be 
sung in the same potentially infinite amount of time. No absurdity there, for the 
number of praises said by the angels will always be finite, even though increasing 
toward infinity as a limit. Or again, if God determined that the angels stop after 
the fourth praise or if one angel were silenced, potentially infinitely many praises 
would be prevented, but in one case only four praises will be said while in the 
other potentially infinitely many will be said. Again, there is no absurdity, since 
the infinity is merely potential. Nothing parallel can be said of a beginningless 
series of events, for given the asymmetry of temporal becoming the past cannot 
be potentially infinite, for then it would have to be finite but growing in a back-
wards direction.’7
Craig went on to argue, among other things, that Morriston’s suggestion that 
we consider future-tensed truths or corresponding tensed facts (rather than future 
events, which on an A-Theory of time are not part of reality) ‘makes two unjusti-
fied assumptions: first, Platonism with respect to propositions and, second, the 
actual infinitude of propositions or facts.’ Craig proposed that ‘The finitist will 
therefore either deny Platonism with respect to propositions, taking them to be 
useful fictions perhaps, or deny that there are an infinite number of propositions, 
6 Craig, “Taking Tense Seriously” (see above, n. 1), 452.
7 Ibid, Section II.
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since, God’s knowledge being non-propositional, propositions are the byproduct 
of human intellection and so merely potentially infinite in number, as we come to 
express propositionally what God knows in a non-propositional way.’8
Morriston, however, is not satisfied with Craig’s reply. In his most recent 
response, Morriston writes, ‘Craig is certainly right about one thing. The number 
of praises that have been said by the angels in my scenario will always be finite. 
Right now, the number is zero. Once the praising has begun, the collection of 
praises that have been said will increase without limit (or, as Craig prefers, ‘toward 
infinity as a limit’). But I was not asking for the number of praises that have been 
said. Instead, I was asking for the number of praises yet-to-be-said – that is, for 
the number of praises, each of which will eventually be said. In the world of my 
thought experiment, the series of praises yet-to-be-said is not growing, is never 
finite, and does not satisfy Craig’s definition of ‘potentially infinite.’’9 
Morriston notes that Craig did answer the question, ‘What is the number of 
praises in the series of future praises?’, and that Craig’s answer was ‘None.’10 Mor-
riston also notes that on Craig’s presentist ontology future events do not exist, 
and that Craig had argued that, unlike past events, future events have not been 
actualized. Nevertheless, Morriston thinks that Craig’s reply does not escape from 
the fact that in his scenario each of the future praises is pre-determined in such 
a way that it cannot fail to be actualized. He argues that in his scenario, it must 
be true that: 
G. For every odd number n, Gabriel will (eventually) have said the nth praise 
in the series of praises that have been said. 
U. For every even number n, Uriel will (eventually) have said the nth praise in 
the series of praises that have been said.
From this, Morriston concludes that, ‘even if “there are” no future events, 
there is still a one-to-one correspondence between the natural numbers and the 
tensed truths in various relevant series.’11
Morriston goes on to argue, among other things, that Craig’s point concerning 
Platonism with respect to propositions is irrelevant (‘I do not think I need to take 
a stand for or against Platonism’), and reaffirms his original conclusion that an 
endless series of pre-determined praises will have the paradoxical implications 
that Craig finds so absurd. ‘In this respect, an endless series (of pre-determined 
events) is on the same footing as a beginningless one.’12
8 Ibid, 454.
9 Morriston, “Beginningless Past and Endless Future” (see above, n. 1), 3.
10 Craig, “Taking Tense Seriously” (see above, n. 1), 444–5.
11 Morriston, “Beginningless Past and Endless Future” (see above, n. 1), 6.
12 Ibid, 12.
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2  Assessment
In assessment of the exchange between Craig and Morriston, I shall argue that, 
contrary to Craig and Morriston, the issue about abstract objects is not a ‘side-
show’, but rather it is of importance for addressing Morriston’s counter-argument 
based on the number of praises yet-to-be-said. With regards to this point, Craig’s 
response that the number of praises that-will-be-said is a potential infinite is inad-
equate, for Morriston is not asking about the praises that-will-be-said, but rather 
the praises yet-to-be-said, the series of which, Morriston argues, is not growing, is 
never finite, and does not satisfy Craig’s definition of potentially infinite, as noted 
above. Craig’s main point in reply to Morriston was about the praises that-will-be-
said, not the praises yet-to-be-said, and thus he misses the thrust of Morriston’s 
counter-argument. In what follows, I shall (unlike Craig) focus on ‘the praises 
yet-to-be-said’.
In response to Morriston’s counter-argument, it seems that proponents of 
the Kalam Cosmological Argument do not have to follow Craig’s proposal to 
either deny Platonism with respect to propositions or deny that there are an 
infinite number of propositions.13 Rather, they can hold the view that the argu-
ment against the possibility of the actual infinite based on paradoxical impli-
cations is directed against the existence and actualization of an actual infinite 
number of concrete entities or events; it is not directed against the existence of 
an actual infinite number of abstract entities. This move has been made, for 
example, by J. P. Moreland, who suggests that the problematic nature of para-
doxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel seems to be related to the fact that (1) the members 
of the set are finite, located, moveable entities, which opens up the possibility of 
adding, subtracting, or rearranging the members of the set, and (2) the members 
of the set are spatially extended. Since abstract entities are not finite, located, 
moveable entities nor spatially extended, the argument against the possibility 
of the actual infinite based on paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel does not apply 
to them.14 I would advance Moreland’s view by proposing that the problematic 
nature of paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel seems to be related to the fact that 
the members of the set have causal powers and are embedded in a network of 
13 Elsewhere, Craig has argued that abstract entities do not exist, but others have responded to 
his views. See the discussion between Craig and others in Paul Gould (ed.), Beyond the Control 
of God?: Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). See 
also Andrew Loke, “On the infinite God objection: a reply to Jacobus Erasmus and Anne Hendrik 
Verhoef” (forthcoming).
14 J. P. Moreland, “A response to a Platonistic and to a set-theoretic objection to the Kalām 
cosmological argument,” Religious Studies, 39 (2003), 379. 
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causal relations (hence they could be moved around). Since abstract entities do 
not have causal powers and are not embedded in a network of causal relations 
in the relevant sense,15 the argument against the possibility of the actual infinite 
based on paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel does not apply to them. 
By making this sort of moves, proponents of the Kalam Cosmological Argu-
ment can accept Platonism and also allow for an actual infinite number of 
abstract entities, including propositions. They can claim that distinguishing 
between abstract infinities and concrete infinities is of great importance. After all, 
mathematicians play around with abstract infinities all the time. For example, if 
an infinite number of members are removed from an infinite set, one can get a 
null set, but one can also get other sets too, depending on how the members are 
removed. It is because of metaphysical problems related to this – as illustrated by 
the ‘absurdities’ of Hilbert’s hotel, for example – that proponents of the Kalam 
argument think that abstract infinities cannot be instantiated in the concrete 
world. Nevertheless, as long as the problems remain in the abstract, that is fine, 
and mathematicians (as well as philosophers such as Morriston) can continue to 
play around with them.
Having made the point that argument against the possibility of the actual 
infinite based on paradoxical implications is directed against concrete rather 
than abstract entities, the proponent of the Kalam argument can reply to Mor-
riston as follows: The number of praises yet-to-be-said – that is, the number of 
praises, each of which will eventually be said – is actual infinite, but the number 
of praises yet-to-be-said do not yet exist as concrete entities or events. Neither 
would it ever be the case that all of them have been actualised as concrete entities 
or events, for no matter how many praises have been said, an angel could still say 
one more. As noted earlier, Morriston agrees that ‘the number of praises that have 
been said by the angels in my scenario will always be finite,’ and that ‘the collec-
tion of praises that have been said will increase without limit.’ One might think 
it absurd that an actual infinite number of praises will never be said even though 
each of the praises will eventually be said, but given that ‘the praises that will 
eventually be said’ do not yet exist as concrete entities or events, this is a problem 
that remains in the abstract and does not cause problem in the concrete world.
While it is true that in Morriston’s scenario each of the future praises is 
pre-determined in such a way that it will eventually be actualized, i. e. while it 
is true that ‘(G) for every odd number n, Gabriel will (eventually) have said the 
nth praise in the series of praises that have been said’ and ‘(U) for every even 
number n, Uriel will (eventually) have said the nth praise in the series of praises 
15 As Graham Oppy, a friend of infinity, notes. See Oppy (see above, n.2), 242.
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that have been said’, nevertheless there will never be a time at which all of the 
future praises are or have been said, and hence never a time at which there is 
or have been an actual infinite of concrete entities or events. Morriston claims 
that there is still a one-to-one correspondence between the natural numbers and 
the tensed truths in various relevant series. However ‘tensed truths’ are abstract 
rather than concrete entities.
With respect to God’s knowledge of the number of praises that will be 
spoken, Morriston notes that Craig has suggested that God knows the whole of 
reality (including the future) by way of a single, indivisible intuition. Morriston 
objects that this tells us nothing about how he knows the future.16 In reply, the 
fact that Craig has not explained the mechanism by which God knows the future 
does not imply that his suggestion is false. On the contrary, given the limitation 
of human cognition we should not be surprised that we have not figured out the 
divine mechanism by which God knows things, or that we could not do so. Hence 
Morriston’s objection is not an adequate reason for rejecting Craig’s suggestion. 
Morriston also objects that Craig’s suggestion does not solve the problem at 
hand. Morriston claims that as long as propositions (G) and (U) are true  –  as 
long as each of them would, if abstracted from the object of God’s ‘undivided 
intuition,’ have the same standing as Mars has two moons – it will be easy to do 
the counterfactual variations on his imaginary angelic praise scenario that drive 
his original argument.17 In reply, Morriston seems to have failed to observe that 
the truths of these propositions abstracted from the object of God’s ‘undivided 
intuition’ remain as abstract entities, and that unlike the two moons of Mars 
which exist as concrete entities the number of praises yet-to-be-said do not exist 
as concrete entities.
In his earlier paper Morriston pre-empted that Craig might perhaps require 
that the members of the collection be concrete rather than abstract, but he 
claimed that one can still derive the same sorts of allegedly absurd implications 
that friends of the Kalam argument claim to be able to derive from a beginning-
less series of events, and thus in the present context this is a matter of no conse-
quence.18 However, as noted above it has been shown in Craig’s reply that one 
cannot derive the same sorts of allegedly absurd implications where actual events 
are concerned. The underlying reason is that in Morriston’s scenario the infinity of 
actual events (i. e. praises said by the angels) involved is merely potential and the 
number of events that happen will always be finite. There will never be a time at 
which infinitely many praises by Raphael have been said and are actually ‘added’ 
16 Morriston, “Beginningless Past and Endless Future” (see above, n. 1), 10–11.
17 Ibid, 11–12.
18 Morriston, “Beginningless Past, Endless Future” (see above, n. 1), 449–450.
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to the praises said, and while the number of praises yet-to-be-said by Raphael 
is actual infinite, these do not exist as concrete entities or events, nor would it 
ever be the case that all of them have been actualised as such. The problem that 
‘infinitely many praises by Raphael are added and the praises of all three angelic 
beings will be said in the same (infinite) amount of time’ remains in the abstract, 
and hence they do not cause problems in the concrete world. Again, there will 
never be a time at which infinitely many said praises would have been prevented, 
for example, by God determining that Gabriel and Uriel stop after praise number 
four or that Gabriel be silent during all the celestial minutes between Uriel’s 
future praises. While the number of praises yet-to-be-said and prevented is actual 
infinite, they do not exist as concrete entities or events. Once again, the problem 
remains in the abstract; they do not cause problems in the concrete world. On the 
other hand, the implications that friends of the Kalam argument claim to be able 
to derive from a beginningless series of events concern actual events that have 
happened, and which would cause problems in the concrete world. Therefore, 
the claim that one can derive the same sorts of allegedly absurd implications is 
false, and hence it is not an adequate justification for thinking that ‘the require-
ment that the members of the collection be concrete rather than abstract’ is a 
matter of no consequence. 
3  Conclusion
In conclusion, a proponent of the Kalam Cosmological Argument can reply to 
Morriston by saying that that the argument against the possibility of the actual 
infinite based on paradoxical implications is directed against the existence and 
actualization of an actual infinite number of concrete entities and events rather 
than against the existence of abstract entities. The number of praises yet-to-be-
said is actual infinite, but they do not exist as concrete entities or events, and 
there will never be a time at which all of them are or have been actualised as 
concrete entities or events. Therefore in the endless future series we will not 
have the paradoxical implications that Craig finds absurd. On the other hand, 
if the series of praises is beginningless, there would have been the actualization 
of an actual infinite number of events, that is, there would have been an actual 
infinite number of praises spoken, and we will have the paradoxical implications 
that Craig finds absurd. Hence, contrary to Morriston, an endless future series 
of pre-determined events and a beginningless series are not in the same boat. 
There cannot be a beginningless past, but there can be an endless future in which 
angels and humans sing the praises of God forever.
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